Content pollution is one of the most common attacks against peer-to-peer file-sharing systems. As such, systems are usually open to users, and the deployed security mechanisms merely examine the sanity of the downloaded files-content pollution attacks can be easily launched. InfoRanking is a mechanism that tries to mitigate this security risk by ranking content items. In this paper, we show through analysis, fluid modeling, and simulation that when InfoRanking is used, attackers can deceive users only when they share corrupted copies of legitimate file versions. Nevertheless, as corrupted files can be immediately detected after being downloaded, this attack is only effective when users enter the system at very low rate and leave relatively fast.
INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing systems generate, even today, a big portion of the Internet traffic. Nevertheless, being used as well for illegally exchanging intellectual property products, such networks create a big income loss to the content industry. To inhibit the unauthorized distribution of content, content owners use both legal means and "attack" methods against such systems. In 2001, Napster, one of the first P2P content delivery systems, was shut down by court order. Moreover, various companies, such as Viralg, RetSpan, and OverPeer, have been established to protect content from unauthorized distribution on P2P systems by means of content pollution [1] [2] [3] [4] .
Content pollution is one of the most common attack methods in P2P content delivery networks. By content pollution, we mean the sharing of fake or corrupted content instead of the original one. Because everyone is allowed to share content in P2P systems, content pollution attacks can be easily launched. Moreover, because of the lack of a central authority, content pollution can be hardly prevented. In 2005, it was detected that more than half of the file copies in the KaZaA network were polluted [3] .
To counteract content pollution in P2P systems, reputation schemes [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have been proposed. The fundamental goal of these schemes is common, i.e., to predict which users, with high probability, will offer appropriate service. This prediction is usually based on user past behavior.
All these methods usually demand modifications of the already deployed protocols. Moreover, they have to give users incentives to vote correctly. Fotiou et al. proposed InfoRanking [11] , a lightweight solution that combats pollution while relaxing the aforementioned requirements. InfoRanking is based on the observation that in P2P systems, malicious users share more versions of the same content than legitimate users [3, 12] . Moreover, it considers positive votes only, which makes its implementation easier, as user actions, such as the fact that they are sharing a file after downloading it, can be regarded as an implicit positive vote.
This paper gives a formal analysis on the performance of InfoRanking and shows how it does limit the effect of attackers' behavior, helping at the same time P2P systems to improve their long-term performance. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the content pollution attack and introduces InfoRanking. Section 3 presents related work in the area. In Section 4, our methodology is presented, and Section 5 gives some basic analysis about the game between attackers and users. Deeper analysis of attacker and user behavior is made in Sections 5.2 and 5.1, respectively. In Section 6, fluid models are built to measure the performance of InfoRanking. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusion and future work plans.
BACKGROUND

Content pollution
Users in P2P systems initially search for the piece of content they want to download using keywords via the P2P application interface. The P2P application may return thousands of results matching these keywords, especially if the content is popular. Among these results, there will be different versions of the same content. For example, the song "The Scientist" may have an mp3 version, a Windows Media Audio version, a version performed by the band "ColdPlay", a version performed by some unknown singer, and such. Versions are distinguished from each other by their "metadata" (e.g., file name, file extension, file properties, keywords, etc.). Versions of which the metadata match their actual content are referred to as clean versions, otherwise they are called fake versions. Example of fake versions can be an executable file masked as a video file, or a file of a song performed by an artist A, which metadata denotes that it is a song of artist B.
Each version has multiple copies. All copies of a version are expected to have the same well-known hash value. . A file advertised as a copy of a version is a clean copy if its computed hash value matches the expected hash value, otherwise it is a corrupted copy. Figure 1 depicts the aforementioned concept.
The hash value can be learned for example through a tracker.
Detection of polluted items, i.e., corrupted copies and fake versions, is a two step process. The first step is performed automatically, immediately after a file has been downloaded; in this step, it is checked whether the file is a corrupted copy or not. The second step involves user interaction, and it is performed some time after the file has been downloaded. During the second step, it is checked whether the downloaded file is a fake version. Corrupted copies are automatically deleted immediately after being downloaded, whereas fake versions are deleted by the users and only after they have detected them (and decided to take this measure). Fake versions are shared by the users that have downloaded them (i.e., are made available to others), until either they delete them (e.g., because they discover that they are fake versions), or the users leave the system.
InfoRanking
InfoRanking is a vote-based approach for ranking information items in user-driven information distribution networks. InfoRanking is based on the observation that in those networks, malicious users provide numerous fake versions of the same information item to avoid blacklisting [3, 12] . When InfoRanking is used, users may vote only positively regarding a specific information item. Moreover, a user may vote only once.
When it comes to a P2P file-sharing network, users may vote for a file. A user's vote for a specific file shows that the user believes that this is a "good" file. The meaning of good depends on the context under which InfoRanking is used. In this paper, we consider as good files the unpolluted files. Because in InfoRanking, users vote only positively, the fact that a user shares a file can be considered as a vote. Therefore, not only is there no need for the deployment of a separate voting subsystem, but as long as a user shares a file, he participates in the voting procedure, so voting incentives are unnecessary.
Zhang et al.
Effect of InfoRanking on content pollution in peer-to-peer systems In a subset V of all files in the system-such as a list of files matching a keywords based search-the score of each file is the sum of all the weighted votes in that subset. Each vote of a user U in V is weighted by a factor w computed as w = 1/ P U C a , where P U C is the sum of U's votes in V and a is a fixed value. As an example, consider a P2P file-sharing network where a user searches for the movie "The free movie". We consider the setup of Figure 2 where in total seven users have versions of that file. Therefore, the user receives the four results shown in Table I . The InfoRanking based score is calculated using a = 1. The first column of Table I contains all the versions that are included in the result set. The second column contains a list of users that share each version, and the third column contains the score of each version. As it can be seen in this table, user U1 shares four versions in the result set; therefore, he has "voted" four times and his vote is weighted by 0.25. On the other hand, users U5, U6, and U7 have voted only once so their votes are weighted by 1. The rank of each file is calculated by summing the weighted votes. In this example, the version with hash value "H3" has the highest score; therefore, this is the one that will be chosen by the user .
The score of each version is computed in a distributed way. Upon receiving a result set, each user calculates the score of each version using the aforementioned formula. Each user may also maintain a blacklist of versions and users; a user will never download a version contained
The grouping of files in Versions is based on their hash. If two files have different file name but the same hash, they are considered to belong to the same version Providing that the user is interested in this version of the movie, InfoRanking does not take into account user preferences; it is up to the user and the system, to isolate files that do not match user preferences. in the blacklist and will never consider the vote of a blacklisted user. It can be seen that when InfoRanking is used, for malicious users to achieve a successful attack, they should outnumber benign users. In a result set in which each malicious user shares on average F m versions, each benign user shares on average F g versions and there exist U g benign users, the number of malicious users should be U m > (F m /F g ) a *U g to lead to the selection of a fake version, i.e., a significant number of malicious users have to cooperate to achieve a successful attack. Moreover, by taking into consideration that fake versions can be blacklisted-either locally, or centrally-malicious users should share multiple fake versions to achieve their goal (this is also observed in measurements in real file-sharing systems, for example, in [3, 12] ) By ranking the versions of content rather than the users, InfoRanking is more robust to Sybil attacks than a userranking system. Nevertheless, there can be cases in which the number of malicious users is so big that a benign user may be convinced to download a polluted item. In those ultra-polluted networks, centralized black lists of polluted items can be used. Those black lists will force malicious users to share even more closely related files to achieve their attack and therefore to lower their vote's weight.
Finally, by allowing positive votes only and by considering the fact that user shares a file as a positive vote, there is no way for attackers to negatively affect the rank of a file.
RELATED WORK
Our paper's contribution is twofold. We show the efficiency of a content pollution prevention mechanism, and we present an analytical approach for modeling P2P systems combining game theory and fluid models. Therefore, related work in two domains is examined; work related to content pollution prevention and work related to analytical evaluation of the impact of attacks in a P2P system.
Content pollution prevention
Content pollution mechanisms can be distinguished to those that rank users and those that rank content. User-ranking mechanisms-such as EigenTrust [8] and Scrubber [13] -deploy voting schemes that allow each user to rank others based on their behavior. The voting results are used in order to build trust relationships. These relationships are propagated, leading to the creation of chains of trust. The rank of each user is calculated in a distributed manner, i.e., each user calculates his own personal rank about the other users. User-ranking approaches suffer from two basic drawbacks: (i) a newcomer does not know who to trust unless his application is preconfigured with a list of trusted users, and (ii) usually, it is easy for a user in a P2P system to change his identity, therefore to "reset" his rank. InfoRanking overcomes these problems; when a user receives his query results, no matter whether he is a newcomer or not, he is able to calculate the rank of each item. Moreover, the identity of each item-usually the result of a hash function applied over its data-is constant and unchangeable.
In contrast to user-ranking approaches, content ranking solutions rank items. Credence [14] is a typical scheme of this type. Credence is a weighted voting protocol in which a user may vote positively or negatively on any object regarding its authenticity. Any user wishing to download some content issues a vote-gather query to collect votes on candidate objects. This query is flooded to the network, and each user that posses votes responds. Credence-in contrast to InfoRanking-requires the modification of the application protocol in use. Moreover, Credence's vote gathering procedure adds communication overhead.
Hybrid solutions-such as a modified version of Scrubber presented in [15] -try to get the best of both worlds. Nevertheless, they introduce significant complexity.
In general, voting schemes require users' cooperation, i.e., users should be willing to vote for other users-or items-and share their votes with others. As a result, voting schemes do not have only to cope with users not voting correctly but also with creating mechanisms that give incentives to users to vote-such as the one proposed in [16] . However, InfoRanking does not face this problem. By using positive votes only, regular users' actions can be considered as votes, for example, the fact that a user is sharing a file can be considered as a positive vote for this file. As we show later in the text, this approach leads to very competitive results.
Analytical evaluation
Various models have been created to abstract complicated P2P systems into simple models. Qiu et al. [17] have created a basic deterministic fluid model to describe a BitTorrent-like system, which models relationships between various entities. This model is further extended by [18] [19] [20] [21] to consider heterogenous peers with different capacities, different arrival processes, and different user behavior. Nevertheless, none of these models considers content pollution in P2P systems.
Few research efforts study the impact of content pollution in P2P systems using an analytical approach. Kumar et al. [22] are using fluid models to model pollution proliferation in P2P systems, which are inspired by [17] . Nevertheless, they do not consider any security solution. Lee et al. [23] create a mathematical model to assess the impact of pollution on file popularity evolution by studying human behavior. Their research is only focused on attackers that pollute a P2P system with fake versions, and it does not consider any security mechanism. Our work considers attackers that pollute a P2P system with either fake versions or corrupted copies. Analytical modeling has also been used to study content pollution impact in P2P live streaming systems-such as in [24] . However, these models cannot be applied in P2P file-sharing systems because in live streaming, chunks are not retransmitted; therefore, if a user receives a corrupted chunk, he cannot download it again.
Finally, game theory has been used in various research efforts to study the free-riding effect in P2P systems [25] [26] [27] . Our work is focused on another type of attack: content pollution.
METHODOLOGY
In P2P systems, users' goal is to download a specific piece of content, such as a software package, a movie, or a song. On the other hand, attackers try to prevent users from achieve this by inserting corrupted copies in the system. Obviously, users and attackers have conflicting interests; users want to increase the probability of downloading a clean copy, whereas attackers want to prevent this. In the real world, these conflicts are usually caused by copyright arguments and intended added advertisements, that is, economic benefit associated with the content and its popularity; popular content has much higher commercial value than unpopular one. In this paper, popular content is considered, that is, content that attracts more than thousands of downloaders. Moreover, the following assumptions are made:
A1: Compared with the large number of downloaders, the number of attackers is limited. That includes the fake accounts that might have been created by an attacker, that is, the system prevents an attacker from creating many fake accounts Effect of InfoRanking on content pollution in peer-to-peer systems A2: Users intend to minimize their probability of receiving and keeping/sharing polluted items. A3: Attackers try to maximize the probability of users receiving polluted items. A4: Among all the strategies leading to the same pollution effect, attackers will choose the one with the lowest cost. A5: Each benign user only shares a single version of a content item, whereas attackers usually share multiple versions. Both benign users and attackers share only one copy for each version. A6: From the downloader's perspective, the copies of the same version look identical. Therefore, no matter whether they use InfoRanking or not, users select a copy to download at random (i.e., uniformly distributed across all the copies of the selected version.)
On the basis of those assumptions, we use three approaches to analyze the effects of InfoRanking: (i) behavior predication inspired by game theory, (ii) system modeling using fluid models, and (iii) simulation.
Initially, the strategies that users and attackers can follow are examined, and the payoff of each strategy with and without InfoRanking is calculated. As a next step, fluid models are used to abstract the evolution of the whole system and to analyze it in steady state, that is, a state in which the rate of users entering the systems and leaving are almost equal. These analytical results are validated using the OMNet++ discrete event simulator [28] . In our analysis, we are considering that versions are ranked on the basis of their InfoRanking scores. If two or more versions have the same score, then they are ranked randomly-with respect to each other.
In the remainder of this paper, the following notation describing the system is used:
The set of all versions of a content item in the system. |V|: The number of versions in the system. V c : The subset of the set V, which includes all the clean versions in the system. V p : The subset of set V, which includes all the fake versions in the system, V c 
A GAME BETWEEN USERS AND ATTACKERS
The pollution problem can be considered as a battle between conforming users and attackers. In this battle, users and attackers can follow various strategies. A user's strategy for selecting a version to download depends on whether an object reputation scheme exists or not. If there is not any scheme, the user will simply choose an available version randomly, or according to his own habits. When InfoRanking is used, the user has the possibility to choose a version according to the corresponding scores given by InfoRanking. Therefore, the possible user strategies are:
(1) Select an available version at random. If a user downloads a corrupted copy of the version with the highest score, there are two strategies for him to choose as a next step:
(1) Select another copy from this version.
(2) Select a copy from another version.
An attacker can choose among several strategies. In general, these strategies are composed by two basic actions: adding a corrupted copy to an existing version or inserting a new fake version to the system. A strategy is denoted as: O s r . If r 6 |V|, then the attacker adds a corrupted copy to the rth ranked version, that is, v r , else the attacker adds a new fake version into the system. Attackers do not have any incentive to add corrupted copies of the fake versions, as the corrupted copies will be immediately detected; therefore, the fake versions will not spread.
User strategy
In this section, user behavior is analyzed, and it is shown that:
Always selecting copy from the version with the highest score is the best strategy for users If a user obtains a corrupted copy, then the best strategy for him is to select another copy from this version.
We consider a network in which attackers follow a greedy strategy (denoted as O s g ). They add as many as possible fake versions and share a corrupted copy for each version in V c . Therefore, if there are N independent attackers in the system, each of whom is able to insert k fake versions, for every clean version, there are N corrupted copies and the total number of polluted items If users randomly select a version from the set V and if there are N independent attackers in the system, each of whom is able to insert k fake versions, then the probability P O s g that a new coming user will select and download polluted content equals: 
is the probability that a user will download polluted content if he randomly selects to download a copy from the highest ranked version. Therefore, selecting a copy form the highest ranked version always has the smallest probability of pollution.
Best strategy for users experiencing pollution.
If a user, who has obtained a corrupted copy from the version with highest rank, selects another version to download, then
is the probability of pollution if the user selects another copy of the highest ranked version. Therefore, in case of pollution, the best user strategy is to select another copy from the highest ranked version, assuming a greedy attacker.
Attackers' strategies
To analyze attackers' strategies, we initially consider the case of the first coming attacker and then we generalize ' According to assumption A5, both benign users and attackers share only one copy of each version k Actually, v 1 denotes the highest ranked version. However, according to the analysis presented later in 5.2, the clean version initially with the largest number of clean copies will always be the highest ranked one and with the largest number of clean copies.
it to the case of multiple independent attackers. In this section, we assume that users always select the highest ranked version.
Strategy of the first coming attacker.
Let A 1 be the first attacker trying to pollute a system in which there already exist l clean versions, that is, |V| = |V c | = l. Two cases are considered; the case in which |v 1 | > 1, that is, there are more than one copies of the highest ranked version, and the case in which |v 1 | = 1, that is, there is a single copy of the highest ranked version, and we will show that the best attack strategy for the attacker A 1 in both cases is the same; O s 1 that is, to insert a corrupted copy to the clean version with the highest ranked. Case |v 1 | > 1
Obviously, if initially |v 1 | = |v 1 c | > 1, it is meaningless for an attacker to add fake versions. The maximum score of a newly added version is 1, which is strictly less than the score of the highest ranked version ** . Therefore, the fake version will never be selected by users. To achieve any disturbance to the system, this attacker has to add corrupted copies to the version with the highest rank. Assume v j is the last ordered item in V, which satisfies that |v j | = |v 1 |. If j = l, namely all clean versions have the same number of clean copies, any strategy O s leads to the same P O s = 1/(|v 1 | + 1). In that case, the attack strategy with the lowest cost is to insert a corrupted copy to one version i from V. Then, this version will have the highest score and should be ordered as the first item in V.
In case j < l and |v j |-|v j+1 | > 1, adding a corrupted copy in version j + 1 to version l has no effect, as Score i O s , i 2 {j + 1, ..., l} will be less than any Score i O s , i 2 {1, ..., j}. Thus, A 1 has to add corrupted copies to the top j versions. Similarly, from the attacker's perspective, the strategy with the best effect and the lowest cost is to add a corrupted copy to a single version, which number of copies equals to |v 1 |.
In case j < l and |v j | -|v j+1 | = 1, adding a corrupted copy to a version, which number of copies equals to |v 1 |, will result to:
On the other hand, adding a corrupted copy to a version, which number of copies equals to |v j+1 |, will result to:
In a nutshell, if initially |v 1 | = |v 1 c | > 1, the best strategy for the first attacker A 1 is always O s 1 , that is, adding one corrupted copy to the highest ranked version. 
Effect of InfoRanking on content pollution in peer-to-peer systems
Case |v 1 
The case in which initially |v 1 | = |v 1 c | = 1, that is, for every clean version there is only one clean copy in the system, is now examined. When A 1 enters the system, he can follow two attack strategies; O s 1 and O s l+1 , that is, add a corrupted copy to the highest ranked version or add a new fake version. The impact of each strategy differs when compared in short-term time frame and in a long-term one. The probability of pollution in short time frame is:
As we always have
frame, the best strategy is O s 1 . The long-term effect cannot be calculated in a straightforward way, as the evolution of the system has to be studied. Because fake versions can only be identified after the content is previewed by the user, in contrast to corrupted copies that can be detected immediately after being downloaded, O s l+1 in the long term will result in the spread of the pollution. To study the strategies' long-term impact, fluid models are created. The following notation is used:
: The rate at which downloaders complete download. Ã: The rate at which clean copies leave the system.
: The rate at which users become aware of having downloaded a fake version and delete it. !: The rate at which users abort the download.
: The rate at which new requesting users arrive.
The strategy O s 1 leads to the simple model of Figure 3 (a). Score 1 O s 1 Á is always greater than the score of any other version in the system. Users may enter only in three states. The first state indicates the procedure of searching and downloading. Because there is only one corrupted copy of |v 1 |, the user in the first state gets a clean copy, with probability 1/(|v 1 | + 1), and is transferred to the respective state. With probability |v 1 |/(|v 1 | + 1), he obtains the corrupted copy. In that case, the hash value helps the user to detect the pollution immediately. The user will not select the same copy again, therefore will get a clean copy with rate in the next step.
The system state can be described by a vector 1 (t) = (m(t), |v 1 (t)|, y(t)) T , where m(t) indicates the number of users at the first sate and y(t) represents the number of users that have downloaded corrupted copies or fake versions. The evolution of 1 (t) can be described by a fluid model as follow:
where the transition matrix Q 1 (t) satisfies
For the second strategy, O s l+1 , we consider the worst case for the user; in the system, there is only one clean version, v clean with one copy, that is, l = 1; therefore, the attacker's strategy is actually O s 2 , that is, he inserts a fake version, denoted as v fake , in the system. The number of copies of v clean and v fake is a function of time t, namely |v clean (t)| and |v fake (t)|, respectively. The states of the system can be described by the vector 2 (t) = (m(t), |v clean (t)|, |v fake (t)|, y(t)) T . 
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Let I[x(t), y(t)] be a function of x(t), y(t) which satisfies that:
I[x(t), y(t)]
We assume that the pollution inserted by the attacker is persistent, that is, one copy of the fake version v fake never leaves the system. The evolution of 2 (t) can be described as follows:
where the transition matrix Q 2 (t) satisfies
where (4) and (5), respectively, and solving them, we can calculate the probability that a new coming user experiences pollution under attack strategies O s 1 and O s l+1 when the system is in steady state.
If the users that share a clean copy leave the system too soon, the number of clean copies in the system will become 0 in the long term. At that time, new coming users can only get a copy of the fake version. That is not the case we are interested in, we rather focus on the case that the system will not collapse because it lacks clean content. The probability that a user selects a corrupted copy under O s 1 and O s l+1 , respectively, equals:
where
Thus, in both short term and long term, if users check what they have download within a reasonable time, O s 1 has bigger negative impact to the system than O s l+1 . Assuming that users want to maximize their benefits, they will check within reasonable time, that is, within
To sum it up, in case that initially: 
Multiple independent attackers.
The single attacker case can be expanded to study the effect of multiple independent attackers, i.e., attackers that do not cooperate in order to achieve the maximum negative impact.
When an attacker enters the system, he does not know if there is pollution in the system or not. To maximize the impact of his attack, he adds a corrupted copy to the version with the highest score. Furthermore, an attacker can reasonably assume that all the other attackers have taken or will follow the same strategy. Therefore, polluting the version with highest score ensures that, firstly, the corrupted copy inserted will be selected and, secondly, the pollution from all attackers has cumulative impact.
Actually, in P2P system with InfoRanking, a phenomenon similar to Matthew effect can be observed; the version with the highest score and providing that it is a clean version, always stays as the top-ranked version.
Simulation results
The analytical results obtained from the previous sections are validated in this section using simulation. A P2P filesharing environment is simulated in which the following roles exist: seeders, that is, users that bootstrap the system with clean versions, attackers, that is, users who try to pollute the system, and regular users who are trying to obtain an information item. That of a regular user-henceforth called simply "users"-is the only role that downloads content. Moreover, users is the only role that after some period of time leaves the system. In our setup initially, seeders enter the system and they are assigned a number of files to share. Then, attackers enter the system and deploy their attack based on certain strategies. Users download items, detect pollution, and leave the system stochastically. A global oracle is responsible for collecting the appropriate statistics. All events are created following the Poisson distribution.
Initially, we examine the case of a single attacker and two attacking strategies, namely O s 1 and O s l+1 . For the |v 1 | = |v 1 c | = 1 case, we consider a network in which a clean copy of a clean version is initially shared by a single seeder. The seeder never leaves the network. Moreover, there exists an attacker that can choose between two strategies: O s 1 , that is, the attacker adds a corrupted copy to the clean version v 1 and O s l+1 , that is, the attacker adds a new, fake version into the system. Figure 4 shows the probability of a user getting polluted under different attack strategies. These results have been obtained by simulating a system in which 5000 users in total enter the network with each user having abandon rate equal to zero. The rest of the simulation parameters are = 0.6, Ã = 0.2 and = 10.
As it can be seen, if InfoRanking is used and users check for pollution relatively fast, in the long term, the probability of pollution becomes 0 when the O s l+1 attack strategy is followed. In this setup, if users check for pollution with rate > 0.25 , that is, 2.4 times the time they need to download a file , the fake version is not propagated; therefore, in the long term, no user gets polluted. Figure 5 shows the probability of pollution when attack strategy O s 1 is followed, with varying Ã and , and with = 0.5 and abandon rate equal to zero. Both simulation and analytical results show that the smaller the rate with which clean copies leave the system (Ã), the smaller is the probability of pollution. Similarly, the higher the rate users enter the system ( ), the smaller is the probability of pollution. This happens because the number of corrupted copies remains stable, whereas the number of clean copies increases in proportion to the rate that users enter the system and inversely proportional to the rate clean copies leave the system. The case that |v 1 | > 1, that is, when the highest ranked version's score is greater than one, is also simulated. In that case, a single attacker can achieve the biggest negative impact with the lowest cost by adding a corrupted copy to the version with the highest score. As it can be seen in Table II , adding a fake version has no effect on the system due to InfoRanking, although polluting all the versions of a file has the same effect as polluting the best scored version and polluting a random version of the file has very low impact. In this simulation setup, we consider a varying number of initial seeders, eight versions of each file with the versions assigned to seeders using a zipf distribution. Each experiment is repeated 10 times for 500 users. The rest of the simulation parameters are: = 0.5, Ã = 0.2, = 0.8 and = 10. The case of multiple independent attackers is also simulated. Initially, we simulate two systems, one being attacked by 10 attackers and one being attacked by 40 attackers. In both cases, attackers add a corrupted copy to the version with the highest rank. We run the experiments for varying Ã and and by setting = 0.5 and the abandon rate equal to zero.
As it can be seen from Figures 6 and 7, both analytical results and simulation verify that the probability of pollution depends on the rate users enter and leave the system. Figure 8 shows the probability of receiving a corrupted copy when the number of attackers varies and = 0.5, Ã = 0.3, and = 50. 
THE EFFECT OF INFORANKING
Modeling a P2P system with InfoRanking
In the previous section, we concluded that in a system where InfoRanking is used:
Independent attackers achieve the maximum impact by inserting a corrupted copy into the version with the highest rank. Users achieve the maximum gain by selecting a copy from the version with the highest rank, by checking the content they get fast enough, and once they get a corrupted copy, by selecting another copy from the same version. The version with the highest rank, providing that it is a clean version, always remains the top-ranked version.
We are now modeling a P2P system in which InfoRanking is applied, using a fluid model. Similarly to the previous section, we are using the vector (t) = (m(t), |v 1 c (t)|, y(t)) T to describe the system, m(t) is the number of users searching or downloading the content, y(t) is the number of users experiencing pollution. Assuming that there are N independent attackers in the system, and because different attackers can insert different corrupted copies into the system, peers download corrupted copies may download another corrupted copy again. Here, when considering the worst case, the number of corrupted copies is equal to the number of the different attackers. Thus, the low boundary of the ratio of peers, which can leave the state "download corrupted", is equal to the ratio of the number of clean copies in the system, that is, |v 1 (t)| |v 1 (t)|+N ). Then, the evolution of (t) can be described as follows:
where the transition matrix Q(t) satisfies:
To study the system in steady state, we set the left part of Equation (8) equal to zero, then by solving Equation (9), the expected number of users in each state can be calculated as follows:
The expected probability that a coming user selects a corrupted copy is:
From Equation (10), we also know that the expected total number of users remaining in the system equals:
According to Little's Formula [29] , in a stable P2P system with InfoRanking, the mean time of a user in the system is: Effect of InfoRanking on content pollution in peer-to-peer systems
Model for P2P system without InfoRanking
To measure the performance improvement that InfoRanking leads to, we model the case in which no security scheme is used. In that case, there is no information to help users to make a decision, so they just choose versions randomly. Attackers pollute the system as much as they can, as there is no security scheme to limit their behavior. So each attacker inserts a corrupted copy to all clean versions and adds as many fake versions as possible. If each attacker is able to add k fake versions in the system the total number of fake versions in the system will be N k, where N is the number of the attackers. Moreover, with the same assumption adopted in Section 5.1, the total number of corrupted copies of a clean version is N |V c |.
Users are assumed to make random selections uniformly across all the available versions, as there is no information to help them to decide which version to download.
In our model, the worst case for benign users is considered, that is, the attackers never leave the system; therefore, the number of fake versions and copies inserted in the system will not decrease, in contrast to the clean copies that leave the system with rate Ã. The vector O (t) = (m(t), x(t), z(t)) T is used to describe the system where m(t) is the number of benign users searching for content, x(t) is the the total number of clean copies of all clean versions, and z(t) the total number of copies from fake versions shared by polluted benign users. Figure 9 shows the states of the system.
Because users who get corrupted copies of clean versions will delete them as soon as the download is finished, they can be regarded as being trapped in the state "searching for content" until they download a clean copy. The fraction of this part of users is expected to be:
Similarly, the fraction of downloaders moving from "searching" state to the state "obtained a clean copy" or to the state "obtained a copy of a fake version" are:
Therefore, the evolution of O (t) can be described as:
In [30] , it is shown that only when + ! > Ã, that is, clean copies do not leave faster than corrupted copies, the probability that the system has clean copies is greater than 0. Here, we only consider the case + ! > Ã. By solving (14) and (15) states can be calculated as follows:
The probability that a new user selects a corrupted copy can be calculated as follows:
Whereas the mean time of a user in the system is:
The effect of InfoRanking
By comparing (11) and (17), it can be seen that the probability of a user that enters the system to get polluted is decreased by:
where Figure 10 shows that difference numerically, which is derived from Equation (19) .
It can be seen that when the number of attackers increases to a certain amount, the probability of getting polluted is extremely high if no security scheme is used. However, when InfoRanking is used, the probability of pollution increases almost linearly with the number of attackers, with a relativly flat slope. Thus, the probability of being polluted is still under control when there are large numbers of attackers in the system. In this figure, we have Similarly, by comparing (13) and (18), we can see the gain in the average time each user spends in the system when InfoRanking is used:
The savings because of InfoRanking in the average time a user spends in the system is visualized in Figure 11 numerically, which is derived from Equation (20) . The shadow area in that area shows the difference between a system without any security scheme and with InfoRanking. It can be seen that when there is no security scheme in the system, the average time spent by a user increases dramatically with the number of attackers, because he wastes a lot of time on fighting the pollution. However, when InfoRanking is used, the probability of pollution becomes low, and the average time spent in the system becomes stable.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the effectiveness of InfoRanking in protecting P2P systems from content pollution. By ranking files rather than users and by considering positive votes only, InfoRanking not only can be easily implemented but also does not require any incentive mechanism for engaging users in the voting procedure. Through analysis, fluid models, and simulation, we analyzed the performance of InfoRanking, considering various scenarios for the behavior of both benign users and independent attackers. In particular, we considered the rate at which users enter and leave a system, as well as the time they need to download a file and to detect pollution. We evaluated those factors in networks where attackers either insert corrupted copies of legitimate versions, or share fake versions. Our findings show if users check for pollution relatively fast (less than ' 2.4 the time to download a file), fake versions are completely eliminated from the system; therefore, the only option for the attackers is to pollute legitimate version with corrupted copies. Nevertheless, as fake files can be immediately detected, this type of attack is only effective in networks in which users enter at a very small rate and leave fast.
Our future work will include the study of P2P filesharing systems under coordinated attacks and the fine tuning of our model parameters to real conditions. Moreover, we believe that with small modifications, our model can be adapted to similar systems, such as P2P live streaming, as well as to systems in which the popularity of content depends on user ranking, for example, application markets that rank applications based on user comments, auctions, and user recommended bookmarks.
